W
hat is represented at early stages of sensory processing in the brain: the perception of "reality" or the perception of illusion? Two studies on pages 881 (1) and 878 (2) of this issue investigate the perception of reality and illusion in monkeys and humans and obtain different answers to this question. Chen et al. (1) used optical imaging to monitor the primary somatosensory cortex of monkeys subjected to a touch illusion stimulus. Meanwhile, Whitney and coworkers (2) monitored the effects of a motion-related visual illusion on the human primary visual cortex by functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Their combined findings highlight the fact that there is no simple answer to the question of how the brain perceives reality versus illusion. Nonetheless, by using illusions to dissociate the perceived image (percept) from the real image (stimulus), the new results signify progress in our understanding of how the brain represents tactile and visual stimuli.
Chen and colleagues (1) adapted an illusion called tactile funneling to use with their squirrel monkey subjects. In the tactile funneling illusion, simultaneous presentation of brief stimuli at multiple points on a human subject's skin produces a single focal sensation at the center of the stimulus pattern even when no physical stimulus is present at this site. The investigators subjected their monkeys to a related tactile illusion-simultaneous stimulation of a single fingertip or different combinations of two fingertips. They then used optical imaging (3) to obtain a two-dimensional activation map of the primary somatosensory cortex of the monkey brains. When they stimulated adjacent fingertips of a monkey, they observed a single, strong focus of activation in area 3b of the primary somatosensory cortex. The focal point of activation was between the representations of the two fingertips even though the actual stimulus was not present at this site. However, when the response was evoked by stimulation of nonadjacent fingertips, the cortical activation pattern showed two separate, weaker foci. The observed patterns of cortical activation in the monkeys parallel both the illusory strong, misplaced perception in humans when adjacent fingertips are stimulated and the correct perception of two separate, weaker sensations when two nonadjacent fingertips are stimulated. The Chen et al. work shows that the primary somatosensory cortex does not truthfully map the body surface [somatotopic "homunculus" (4, 5) ], but rather represents an internal brain image that is linked to subjective perception rather than to objective sensory input.
A comparable representation of an illusion during early cortical processing is also seen in the visual system. Macknik and Haglund (6) used a visual masking illusion in monkeys and asked exactly the same question: Does activation of the primary visual cortex represent the physical stimulus or the generated illusion? In this case, a flickering oriented bar with two counterphase flickering flanking bars that masked the center stimulus were presented to monkeys. All three stimuli, when shown separately, generated retinotopic activation of the monkey primary visual cortex, that is, the visual cortex activation pattern corresponded directly to the activation pattern elicited by the visual stimulus on the retina. However, when the center stimulus was masked, representation of the center stimulus (still physically present) on the visual cortex disappeared just as it started to become perceptually invisible. This strengthens the notion that the primary sensory cortex, whether visual or somatosensory, is activated in a manner that corresponds to the perceived stimulus. Thus, representations on the primary sensory cortex reflect integrated higher brain functions rather than simple topographic representations of physical stimuli detected by the peripheral sensory system (4, 5, 7) .
In fact, it is not as simple as that. Singlecell recordings in the primary (V1) and higher (V2) regions of the monkey visual cortex show (8) figure) is represented by V2 neurons in the orientation of the illusory lines but by V1 neurons in the reverse (vertical) orientation (9) . In their new work, Whitney et al. (2) report findings that parallel these observations of a "reverse image." They used fMRI of the primary visual cortex of human subjects to show not only dissociation of the real image from the perceived image, but also generation of a reverse image of the perceived illusion. For their visual stimulus, these investigators used a square of constant size that appeared perceptually smaller when the gratings that marked its corners were moved inward and larger when they were moved outward. However, the activated region of the primary visual cortex of the human subjects expanded when viewing the former image but shrank when viewing the latter image.
When comparing the Whitney et al. results (2) with those of Chen et al. (1) and with previous findings (6, 8, 9) , it appears that the degree of cortical activation enabling emergence of a perceived image is related to the type of information that generates the illusion-in these cases, topogra-
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Reality versus illusion. What is represented at early stages of sensory processing in the brain-the perception of "reality" or the perception of illusion? In the grating illusion shown, illusory horizontal lines are generated by a series of gratings of oblique lines abutting each other in a staggered sequence. This is one kind of illusion (9) used to dissociate perception from reality and to ask whether the primary visual cortex in the posterior region of the brain perceives the real image (oblique lines) or the illusion (horizontal lines). When different visual and somatosensory illusions are used, the answer to how the brain perceives illusion is often different. phy, orientation, and motion. Specific information processing for motion is known not to take place in the primary visual cortex but rather in higher cortical regions such as the mediotemporal area (10, 11) . The closely related medial superior temporal area (12) processes optical flow images generated as one moves in three-dimensional space (the objects in such images seem to expand as one approaches them but contract as one moves away). The cells in these areas are highly sensitive to direction, and they act reciprocally through feedback pathways that connect with the V1 region of the primary visual cortex (13) . At this point, the encoding of spatial cues by V1 neurons and those of the primary somatosensory cortex seems to correlate well with perception (1, 6) when no higher order sensory features (such as motion) are involved. However, the different findings of Chen et al. and Whitney et al. demonstrate clearly that perception of cues other than position may not be related to V1 activity (2, 8, 9) . Encoding of position cues in the V1 region may be more flexible than generally accepted and is apparently subject to modulation by compensation (2) or suppression (8) of the perceived illusions mediated by feedback signals.
N E U R O S C I E N C E

Illusions and Perceived
With the help of illusions, neuroscience is beginning to bridge the gap between psychology and the psychophysics of perception on the one hand and brain activity on the other. The question of whether brain activity in the primary somatosensory or visual cortex represents a truthful mirror of physical input or an image of perception cannot be answered by a simple "yes" or "no." The answer depends on the sensory system investigated and the stimulus used. In many cases, the image of the world within the brain is congruent with neither the "real" nor the perceived world. Illusions have been used as tools to understand the brain for more than 100 years, as exemplified by the work of the 19th-century psychophysicist Hermann von Helmholtz (14) . It is only recently, however, that illusions have been exploited to elucidate the cortical representations of sensory stimuli and to localize the brain regions where real stimuli turn into perceptions (1, 2, 6, 8, 9) . T he geological record of Earth's climate resembles Arthur Conan Doyle's curious incident of the dog that didn't bark in the night (1). The Sun grows hotter with time, yet the temperature at Earth's surface does not leave the narrow constraints of the melting and boiling points of waterat least not for long. It seems that the dog did whimper during a period known as Snowball Earth, when much of Earth's surface appears to have been frozen. This episode occurred in the Neoproterozoic (1000 to 540 million years ago), just before complex fossils emerged in the geological record (2) .
It is not difficult to explain the overall stability of the climate record. The problem is explaining why the dog barked at all. On page 859 of this issue, Ridgwell et al. (3) argue that calcium carbonate (CaCO 3 ) precipitation played a key role. The presentday carbon cycle is stabilized by plankton that precipitate CaCO 3 in the open ocean. These organisms, coccolithophoridae and foraminifera, had not yet evolved in the Snowball days, and hence most CaCO 3 deposition in the ocean took place in coastal waters. This difference may have been crucial in the events that drove Earth into the Snowball state.
The overall stability of Earth's climate is generally attributed to a balance between degassing of CO 2 from deep within Earth, and consumption of CO 2 by weathering reactions at Earth's surface. Urey (4) (6) . This thermostat appears to have broken down during Snowball Earth. The Snowball Earth hypothesis is based on geological evidence of multiple glaciations at sea level in low latitudes. The glaciation deposits are accompanied by "banded iron formations," which appear to mark the oxidation of an iron-rich anoxic ocean. They are overlain by caps of mineralogically peculiar CaCO 3 deposits that resemble abiotic precipitates from a highly supersaturated ocean.
The leading explanation for the Snowball is a runaway ice-albedo feedback. When ice 
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